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ABSTRACT 
The FULRO rebellion in September 1964 was the direct result of Vietnamese 
meddling with Montagnard political identity, political identity created through 
Catholic missionaries, French colonialists, and American attempts to use the 
Montagnards to further their own political objectives.   The overarching conclusion 
of this thesis asserts that the unintended results of prolonged historical abuse and 
misunderstanding of the Montagnard people contributed to the political instability 
of the central highlands of Vietnam around the time period of the Vietnam War. This 
instability caused serious complications for American and South Vietnamese efforts 
to secure the porous Central Highlands of Vietnam against communist aggression.  
Militant Montagnard nationalism, compounded by communist military operations in 
South Vietnam, contributed to the destabilization of the strategically important 
Central Highlands during the critical year of 1964. As a result, the United States 
government introduced large scale American military intervention into South 
Vietnam to combat the communist threat in South East Asia.  While international 
communism, and not Montagnard nationalism, was the primary political factor 
causing American intervention, the story of the creation of a Montagnard militant 
nationalist identity plays an important role in the narrative of the Vietnam War. This
 iv 
 
was a definitive contributing cause to the political turmoil within South Vietnam that 
influenced American intervention in an effort to create a viable American-assisted 
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On September 19, 1964, Tracy Atwood, a volunteer agricultural training 
specialist, finished his daily assignments at the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
(CIDG) camp located at a remote, but strategically crucial village of Buon Sar Pa.  
Buon Sar Pa is located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam along route 14, on the 
border of Cambodia and Vietnam, and south west of the Darlac province capital Ban 
Me Thuot.  This strategic location on the borders of Vietnam and Cambodia provided 
American Special Forces Green Berets, and their indigenous comrades, a key forward 
operations base (FOB) to conduct interdiction patrols to interrupt North Vietnamese 
supply routes into South Vietnam.  Atwood’s primary responsibility as a member of 
the International Volunteer Services (IVS) was to teach local village inhabitants of the 
Central Highlands modern agricultural techniques.  These techniques would allow 
Montagnard villagers the ability to add to their crop yield, improving the village’s 
standard of living.  On Saturday, September 19, Tracy concluded his classes in the 
early evening. He decided to remain for the night in Buon Sar Pa instead of risking a 





agricultural center in Duc Lap.1  
Before retiring to bed, Atwood was approached by a CIDG battalion 
commander, a member of the native Rhade tribe assigned to Buon Sar Pa as part of 
the American led CIDG program.  This Rhade battalion commander unintelligibly 
communicated that there would be trouble in the camp, but emphasized that no 
Americans would be hurt.  The Rhade tribesman did not elaborate on his definition 
of trouble.  Preparing for the worst, Captain Charles Darnell, Special Forces team 
leader at Buon Sar Pa, armed Atwood with a carbine and showed him where the 
emergency bunker was located in the event that trouble in the camp should arise.2    
 At approximately 1:00 A.M. on the morning of September 20, Atwood and 
members of the Special Forces Detachment assigned to Buon Sar Pa were awakened 
by automatic weapons fire and the sounds of combat raging throughout the camp.  
Expecting a Viet Cong attack, Atwood futilely searched for his carbine in the location 
where he had left it upon retiring to bed, but it was gone.  Remembering the 
contingency plan provided to him the evening before by Captain Darnell, Atwood 
exited his quarters in an effort to retreat to the emergency bunker.  As Atwood 
exited the bunkhouse he was met by members of the indigenous force detachment.  
One of them shouted in English “This is our Night!  We’re going to kill Vietnamese!”3  
Rhade tribesmen took Atwood to the Special Forces bunkhouse where he was met
                                                          
1 Gerald C. Hickey, Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict (Lubbock: Texas Tech 
University Press, 2002), 152–153. 
2 Gerald C. Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands 1954-1976 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 99–100. 




by Captain Darnell and the other five members of the split Special Forces 
detachment.  On the way to the team bunkhouse, Atwood witnessed the execution 
of the Vietnamese interpreter and the discarding of Vietnamese Special Forces 
soldiers’ bodies into the camp latrine.  A few hours went by before the sounds of 
rebellion subsided with the surrendering of the remaining Vietnamese soldiers 
assigned to the camp.   
Rhade tribesman and indigenous camp commander, Y-Dhon Adrong, entered 
the bunkhouse and informed Captain Darnell that the organization, the United 
Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races, better known by its French acronym 
FULRO4, had confiscated the camp in an effort to reclaim tribal land they alleged had 
been stolen by the Government of South Vietnam.  From 1956 to 1959, tribal land 
had been confiscated through a government land redistribution program.  This 
program took tribal land and gave it to Vietnamese refugees in an attempt to 
repopulate tribal lands with Vietnamese settlers in order to ease population 
pressure in the coastal lowlands.  By midmorning on September 20, 1964, what 
became known as the Montagnard Rebellion had spread to the provincial capital of 
Ban Me Thuot and encompassed five strategically important CIDG camps situated in 
Darlac province around Ban Me Thuot.  An estimated 3,000 American-trained and 
armed Rhade tribesmen were in open rebellion, killing 29 Vietnamese soldiers, 
seizing control of the provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot, and taking approximately 
                                                          
4 The official French name for the Montagnard nationalist movement FULRO is Front Uni de Lutte des 
Races Opprimees. 
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120 hostages. Twenty of those hostages were American military and civilian 
personnel.5  The FULRO rebellion in September 1964 was the direct result of 
Vietnamese meddling with Montagnard political identity, political identity created 
through Catholic missionaries, French colonialists, and American attempts to use the 
Montagnards to further their own political objectives.    
European Catholic missionaries, practicing a holistic approach to 
ethnography, recorded the first descriptions of Montagnard culture.  Missionaries 
created language tools and educational materials to assist missionaries in their 
proselytizing efforts among the indigenous populations of South East Asia.  Daily 
interactions between missionaries and natives were interpreted through a western 
lens, contributing to the creation of Montagnard identity by categorizing villages 
based on linguistic, social, and proximity designations. In contrast, under French 
colonial practices the indigenous populations were designated and grouped under a 
single cultural identifier, Montagnard, used by French colonialist to identify the 
indigenous populations in census data and other government records and 
communications.  French colonial administrators separated Vietnam’s ethnic 
populations to maximize their political and military control by implementing a divide 
and conquer strategy.  This was done by French intent to use ancient racial antipathy 
to eliminate the threat of a combined nationalist identity to ease colonial 
administrative burdens.  This was done by creating a semiautonomous area for each 
                                                          
5 Jack Langguth, “Montagnard Revolt in Vietnam Believed Averted,” New York Times, January 26, 1965, 2. 
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ethnic group who administered the area politically and militarily under French 
supervision.  This developed what Professor Thongchai Winichakul terms a “Geo-
Body,” or the creation of national identity through spatial creation of national 
boundaries using modern technologies of mapping, and government administration.  
Vietnamese policies of forced cultural assimilation instilled the motivation to rebel 
and create an independent Montagnard nation. With the American creation of the 
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) in December 1961 indigenous populations 
learned to protect their villages from communist subversion and intimidation and 
inadvertently provided the means to rebel against the South Vietnam government.  
All of these contributing factors led to the creation of a Montagnard “imagined 
community,” or a nationalist movement to create a political identity that would 
provide basic protections to the indigenous population caught in the middle of an 
ideological battle between democracy and communism.    
The overarching conclusion of this thesis asserts that the unintended results 
of prolonged historical abuse and misunderstanding of the Montagnard people 
contributed to the political instability of the central highlands of Vietnam around the 
time period of the Vietnam War. This instability caused serious complications for 
American and South Vietnamese efforts to secure the porous Central Highlands of 
Vietnam against communist aggression.  Militant Montagnard nationalism, 
compounded by communist military operations in South Vietnam, contributed to the 
destabilization of the strategically important Central Highlands during the critical 
6 
year of 1964. As a result, the United States government introduced large scale 
American military intervention into South Vietnam to combat the communist threat 
in South East Asia.  While international communism, and not Montagnard 
nationalism, was the primary political factor causing American intervention, the 
story of the creation of a Montagnard militant nationalist identity plays an important 
role in the narrative of the Vietnam War. This was a definitive contributing cause to 
the political turmoil within South Vietnam that influenced American intervention in 
an effort to create a viable American-assisted and democratic South Vietnamese 
government.6   
The United Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races is an ethnonationalist 
movement combining the indigenous autonomy movements of the Cham, Khmer 
Krom, and Montagnards.  These native groups inhabit the border lands of modern 
day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.  The primary support for FULRO came from the 
Montagnard Rhade Tribe, with an estimated population total of 100,0007 located 
around Darlac province’s capital Ban Me Thuot.  FULRO disbanded in 1992 entering 
into a United Nations mediated agreement with the Vietnamese government to end 
armed political dissidence in the highlands of Vietnam.8   FULRO militantly advocated 
for the right of autonomy for the indigenous populations of South East Asia, with a 
primary focus on the Montagnards, who were principally located in the Central 
                                                          
6 George W. Ball, “Top Secret: The Prophecy the President Rejected,” Atlantic Monthly 230, no. 1 (1972): 
37. 
7 Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands 1954–1976, 300–303. 
8 Human Rights Watch, Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts Over Land and Religion in Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 27. 
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Highlands of Vietnam.  FURLO’s political and administrative roots germinated out of 
an earlier nationalist movement known as BAJARAKA.9  The BAJARAKA movement 
was created in 1956 to protest the abusive policies of President Ngo Dinh Diem, who 
stole Montagnard land, ended the practice of teaching tribal languages and history 
in schools, and eliminated the Montagnard semiautonomous political region created 
by the French. These oppressive policies created a catalyst for political organization 
among the Montagnard community, inspiring protests against President Diem’s 
policies created to assimilate the indigenous population through cultural eradication.  
Peaceful protests conducted by Montagnards in Ban Me Thuot in October of 
1958 enraged Diem, who effectively dismantled the BAJARAKA in the late 1950s 
through a combination of totalitarian tactics that included illegal imprisonments and 
the relocation of key leaders throughout the country of South Vietnam.10  Because 
the majority of the BAJARAKA leaders were employed by the government, Diem was 
able to disguise his malicious intentions by ordering the transfers of these individuals 
to new administrative posts.  The President of BAJARAKA, Y-Bham Enoul, and his 
executive committee were imprisoned for their role in the events leading up to the 
October 1958 protests, spending the next five and a half years in various South 
Vietnamese prisons as punishment for their alleged role in undermining the Diem 
government.  These tactics effectively dismantled the Montagnard nationalist 
                                                          
9 BAJARAKA is a name derived from the first two letters of the four primary tribes represented in the 
movement: Bahnai, Jaria, Rade (Rhade), and Kaho (Koho). 
10 Peter Grose, “Tribes Trouble Saigon: Rebellions Point up Need for Government to Win Wider Allegiance 
in War Against Communists,” New York Times, October 4, 1964, E6. 
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movement represented by BAJARAKA in its early stages, allowing Diem to continue 
to displace the indigenous population of the Central Highlands with Vietnamese 
refugees to secure the highlands from communist incursions and assimilate the 
Montagnards into the national South Vietnamese identity.  President Diem’s 
totalitarian tactics continued to anger American and Vietnamese leaders that on 
November 2, 1963, President Diem and his brother Nhu were assassinated during a 
South Vietnamese military coup led by General Duong Van Minh and supported by 
American leaders in Saigon and Washington D.C. This American coup and 
assassination was the first of many such political upheavals that contributed to the 
political turmoil affecting South Vietnam.  
In January 1964, General Nguyen Khanh overthrew the military junta led by 
General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh) that had replaced President Diem.  In an effort 
to repair the Vietnamese government’s relationship with the Montagnards, Khanh 
released the BAJARAK leaders from prison on February 1, 1964, appointing Y-Bham 
Enoul as Deputy Province Chief for Highland Affairs in Darlac Province.11  Khanh, who 
had served in the Central Highlands as a military leader in the 1950’s, felt he 
understood the Montagnard political situation better than most Vietnamese leaders.  
As commander of II Corps he met with the BAJARAKA leaders before they were jailed 
by Diem in 1958.  Khanh’s effort was meant to increase Montagnard loyalties to the 
government, which had consistently abused the native population, creating racial 
                                                          
11 Hickey, Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict, 161. 
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antipathy and political backlash. Upon release from prison, Y-Bham Enoul and other 
nationalist leaders revived Montagnard autonomist sentiment, preparing the 
political environment in the Central Highlands for a full scale revolt in 1964.   
The indigenous populations of the Central Highlands are known as 
Montagnards, French for mountaineer or highlanders.  They are an ethnically diverse 
native population, distinct from the Vietnamese in both language and customs.  The 
French colonial distinction of “Montagnards” was comprised of 30 to 35 tribes,12 
totaling an estimated 700,00013 to 1,000,00014 people, or roughly five percent15 of 
the population of South Vietnam in 1964.  Montagnard tribal land comprises an 
estimated two-thirds of the total land mass of South Vietnam,16 bringing the 
numerically superior lowland Vietnamese into constant turmoil with the 
Montagnards over land rights.  French colonialists began referring to the indigenous 
tribes of the Central Highlands as Montagnards in the mid to late 19th century.  The 
term implies that the indigenous people are a unified group in language, customs, 
religion, and demonstrate homogeneity among their daily interactions.  By referring 
to the tribal inhabitants of the Central Highlands by their French designation 
Montagnards, the various tribal differences were forgotten, and the unique mosaic 
                                                          
12 Grose, “Tribes Trouble Saigon: Rebellions Point up Need for Government to Win Wider Allegiance in 
War against Communists,” E6. 
13 Langguth, “Montagnard Revolt in Vietnam Believed Averted,” 2. 
14 Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1967), V. 
15 Grose, “Tribes Trouble Saigon: Rebellions Point up Need for Government to Win Wider Allegiance in 
War against Communists,” E6. 
16 Charles Mohr, “Vietnamese Fear a Tribal Uprising: Loyalty of Mountain People to Saigon Regime Fades,” 
New York Times, April 13, 1966, 1. 
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that created this thriving ethnic Petri dish is incorporated into an oversimplified 
version of a unique and complicated ethnic history.   
Before exploring nationalism among the inhabitants of the Central Highlands 
of Vietnam, it is important to understand what nationalism is and its role in creating 
a nation among multiethnic peoples who are bound by their primordial ties to 
smaller social, ethnic, and political groups.  Political scientist Benedict Anderson 
defined nationalism as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.”17 The people within any given community, 
depending on size, will never meet and establish a personal relationship with the 
majority of the people designated as citizens of a specified community.  But in each 
of these citizens is embodied the idea of what it means to be part of that imagined 
community, an idea worth defending and dying to protect, an ideal that keeps 
people of different social, economic, and political backgrounds united in a feeling of 
fraternity where no physical connection exists.   Nationalism is a political invention. 
It is a creation of a nation where one did not exist before, typically at the expense of 
primordial ties that have traditionally defined a particular group of people.      
Professor Thongchai Winichakul contributes to Professor Benedict Anderson 
definition of nationalism as an “imagined community” by adding the idea of 
“negative identity,”18 or the ability to identify what it does not mean to be 
                                                          
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1992), 6. 
18 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (University of Hawaii Press, 
1994), 5. 
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associated with a certain group.  This is typically seen among ethnic groups that 
characterize themselves by the differences they perceive among competing ethnic 
groups in a specified geographic area, or “Once the un-Thainess [un-
Vietnameseness, un-Montagnardness] can be identified, its opposite, Thainess 
[Vietnameseness and Montagnardness], is apparent.”19  Winichakul discusses the 
creation of the modern Geo-Body using Siam, or modern day Thailand, as a case 
study to describe the creation of a modern nation state to define territoriality 
through modern ideas of borders.  Through mapping, a specified area is designated 
as a nation through the combining of ancient boundaries. Newly identified rulers 
develop a common language to communicate what it means to be part of the new 
Geo-Body, and develop an ability to enforce or defend that newly geographic area 
from internal or outside antagonists.  The creation of the Geo-Body is concrete, but 
the idea supporting the creation through mapping of the Geo-Body, or what it 
means to be part of that community, is not defined and will change as political 
thought ebbs and flows in any given modern nation. 
Through modern techniques of mapping, Western powers created arbitrary 
lines of demarcation that combined religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and tribal 
community identifiers into an expansion of empire, or into a Geo-Body and 
“Imagined Community.”  This empire expansion broadened the meaning of being 
part of the empire as a citizen versus what it meant to be associated through a 
                                                          
19 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, 5. 
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native participation, void of the same rights and privileges awarded to a citizen.  As 
empires grew and consolidated power by defeating the primordial political 
structures, native populations began to form ideas of nationhood.  By developing 
political associations, indigenous populations were able to set aside “narrow 
loyalties, petty jealousies, and ignorant prejudices”20 of their splintered communities 
to become a unified identity, working to gain their Geo-Body back from colonialists. 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that there are two primary motivations 
behind setting aside ethnic loyalties for the creation of a larger community: “[First] 
the desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and 
opinions matter; and [second] the desire to build an efficient, dynamic modern 
state.”21 The first motivation to be recognized is the desire to have an identity, or a 
name that is publicly recognized and given certain rights and privileges in the newly 
created nation. The second motivation is the desire to have access to an improved 
standard of living through economic, political, and educational progress.  The desire 
to be recognized as part of a greater community through subordination of primordial 
ties threatens to extinguish the definition used by people to identify and unite their 
individual communities at the expense of increasing their access to a better quality 
of life.  In order to establish a truly modern state, an understanding of “fellow 
feeling” has to take place, which is the “…longing not to belong to any other 
                                                          
20 Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States, in Old 
Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Gertz (New York: Collier-
Macmillian, 1963), 105. 
21 Ibid., 106. 
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group.”22 The ability of a politician to create this feeling among the various 
communal differences of any modern state is the cornerstone to establishing a 
viable, dynamic political system that unites a large community under a common 
moniker.  But in order for the politician to combine ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
regional ties into fellow feeling, or the idea of being part of an “imagined 
community,” he or she must incubate a political structure that combines primordial 
sentiments to a new found loyalty to the state apparatus.  This allows the original 
identity to be continued and not replaced and to be understood in the context of the 
more inclusive community.  But to have a community, it has to be physically created. 
The Montagnard community was first created through a series of colonial and 
government policies that sought to identify the indigenous population and explain it 
in western terms.  With the introduction of Catholic missionaries into Vietnam 
during the 16th century, the western world received their first records of the 
“savages” inhabiting the Central Highlands, and Montagnard identity began to be 
explained in western nationalistic terms.
                                                          
22 Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States, in Old 
Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, 107. 
CHAPTER 2 
MISSIONARIES, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND THE CREATION OF IDENTITY 
 
 
In 1535 the Portuguese expanded their commercial grasp into South East Asia 
when Antonio Da Faria established an economic center in modern day Da Nang.  The 
Portuguese found Da Nang bay to be a suitable port for ships of all sizes, strategically 
located along the direct shipping routes in the South China Sea.  The Portuguese 
foray into Vietnam was short lived, failing to capitalize on long term influence in Asia 
due to their hubris, political corruption, and mismanagement. At this same time, 
larger more powerful European powers were expanding their empires in direct 
competition with the Portuguese, ending their early dominance in South East Asia.23 
European forays into Vietnam were difficult and filled with economic 
disasters.  In the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, Vietnam was divided by civil war 
among warring families, the Trinh in the north in the Red River Delta region and the 
Nguyen in the south in the Mekong Delta region.24  Europeans attempting to open 
economic and diplomatic relationships with these warring factions found it difficult 
to penetrate the ruling courts of Vietnam, which were heavily influenced by the 
                                                          
23 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 57. 




Chinese Confucian political model.25  Regardless of their extreme hatred for one 
another, the Vietnamese warring factions hated foreigners more. Despite their inner 
conflicts, they worked to expel the Europeans, who played a double-dealing political 
role by selling weapons and munitions to both sides of the civil war.  This European 
duplicity created deep seeded animosity among the Vietnamese towards the 
western invaders.  By the end of the 1600s only the Portuguese remained as the 
Dutch, French, and English closed their diplomatic offices in Hanoi and Pho Hien and 
returned to Europe.  Commercial interests failed in opening Vietnam to western 
influence, but religious missionaries, specifically of the Catholic faith, left a lasting 
impact on both the coastal Vietnamese and the indigenous tribes inhabiting the 
mystical Annamite Mountains. 
Jesuit missionaries seeking refuge after their expulsion from Japan 
established a mission in the Portuguese trading center of Da Nang.26  With European 
influence waning in Vietnam, Christian missionaries sought to convert the masses of 
“heathen barbarians” of South East Asia in an effort to spread the message of Jesus 
Christ.  As Catholic converts slowly grew in Vietnam, the arrival of Alexandre de 
Rhodes forever changed the ability of missionaries to teach the Vietnamese in their 
own language as a result of Rhodes’s creation of the Romanized Vietnamese 
alphabet.  Born in the French town of Avignon, Rhodes was first introduced to 
Vietnam accompanying Portuguese Catholics traveling to Vietnam.  Arriving at the 
                                                          
25 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 58. 
26 Peter C. Phan, Mission and Catechesis: Alexandre de Rhodes and Inculturation in Seventeenth-Century 
Vietnam (New York: Orbus Books, 1998), 10. 
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age of 28 in 1627, Rhodes set out to master the Vietnamese language.  After six 
months of intensive study, Rhodes began to proselytize using his mastery of the 
language to influence converts to the Catholic faith.27   
With the increasing influence of Catholicism and the supplanting of Confucian 
mandarins in the lives of the Vietnamese Catholic converts, the political courts of 
Vietnam outlawed Christianity, imprisoning and executing missionaries who violated 
the emperor’s edict.  But faithful missionaries continued to return to Vietnam even 
though they faced persecution from the rulers of Vietnam.28  Recognizing the 
weakening influence of Portugal in Vietnam, Rhodes and other missionaries began to 
seek political support from other Catholic nations in an effort to open Vietnam to 
western influence.29  Attempting to overturn the 15th century Papal edict that 
granted Vietnam as Portugal’s domain, Rhodes combated stiff Portuguese resistance 
to finally establish the French supported Society of Foreign Missions to advance 
Christianity in Asia.  Rhodes lobbied to eliminate Portuguese influence in Vietnam,30 
which allowed for the more powerful French empire to become involved in Vietnam 
through the exploits of its citizens as missionaries and merchants working for the 
French East India Trading Company.  French missionaries became employees of the 
company, expanding French economic influence while attempting to convert the 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 39–48. 
28 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 60. 
29 Phan, Mission and Catechesis: Alexandre de Rhodes and Inculturation in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam, 
66–67. 
30 Ibid., 67. 
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Vietnamese to Christianity.31 
Throughout the 18th century European missionaries and merchants faced stiff 
opposition from the Vietnamese ruling elite, who remained suspicious of western 
motives in trading with and converting their subjects.  French support for the 
expansion of empire in Asia was limited by the economic and social concerns of the 
French citizenry and the fight against England over influence in North America.  A 
few French business, political, and religious leaders kept the dream of a French 
empire in Asia alive by investing time and money to expand their influence for the 
domination of Vietnam. Vietnamese political resistance and a lack of interest from 
French citizens preoccupied with domestic issues in the late 18th century limited the 
success of independent attempts by French citizens to expand their economic and 
religious influence in Vietnam.  European incursions into Vietnam were compounded 
by the constant state of civil war between the southern Nguyen Kingdom and the 
Trinh Kingdom in the north.32  This civil war depleted Vietnamese treasuries and 
placed extreme hardship on the Vietnamese people who experienced death and 
persecution by the two warring kingdoms.  In an effort to rectify these wrongs a 
populist movement erupted into rebellion, changing the Vietnamese political 
landscape. 
The Tayson Rebellion erupted against the southern Nguyen rulers in 1772, 
                                                          
31 Oscar Chapuis, A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc (Westport: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1995), 171. 
32 George Dutton, The Tay Son Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth-Century Vietnam (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 2. 
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when three brothers accused of fraudulent business practices by the local Mandarins 
fought back.  Originally limited to the region of Quinhon, the rebellion quickly grew 
into a populist movement with the rapid swelling of the Tayson army’s ranks as 
peasants, tired of the mistreatment and abuse perpetrated by the Nguyen officials, 
flocked in droves to the Tayson cause.  By 1775, three years after the start of the 
rebellion, the rebels had engulfed the southern portion of Vietnam displacing the 
Nguyen rulers and their oppressive policies with progressive taxation and land 
reform that alleviated the issue of land among the peasant class.  Along with these 
progressive reforms, the Tayson leaders permitted Catholic missionaries to openly 
proselytize among the people of Vietnam.  This acceptance of Catholic missionaries 
marked the end of the progressive rebellion as missionaries collaborated with 
political factions to reinstate the Nguyen dynasty.33 
Nguyen Anh, the sole survivor of the Nguyen dynasty, escaped to Siam early 
during the rebellion.  Maintaining close contact with political supporters, Nguyen 
Anh led multiple incursions back into Vietnam to reconquer his dynastic realm, 
experiencing brief military success before being defeated by a superior Tayson army.  
In the 1780s Nguyen Anh met the French priest Pigneau de Behaine who became the 
chief advisor to the young Nguyen ruler.34  Using his European contacts, Behaine 
armed the Nguyen armies with modern weapons and through a series of military 
reforms led the Nguyen armies to successive victories that reunited the Vietnamese 
                                                          
33 Dutton, The Tay Son Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth-Century Vietnam, 1–3. 
34 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 63.  
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nation under the Nguyen dynasty in 1802.  The Nguyen dynasty would survive for 
the next 150 years, concluding with the final descendant of the Nguyen dynastic 
clan, French collaborator Emperor Bao Dai, being deposed by the upstart Ngo Dinh 
Diem in 1955 and retired to France to live out the rest of his days under the 
protection of the French government.35 
For the three centuries since the introduction of European influence into 
South East Asia, western religious and commercial interests focused on the easily 
accessible coastal lowlands, effectively ignoring the native inhabitants who 
continued to flourish as primitive peoples in the seclusion and protection of the 
jungle covered mountains of South East Asia.  But with the rising persecution of 
Catholic missionaries, the primitive indigenous populations became the primary 
targets for civilization through conversion to Christianity.  With the introduction of 
western ideals and the desire to understand native populations in an effort to civilize 
them, the first seeds of a modern Montagnard identity were planted by Catholic 
missionaries who categorized and documented the diverse tribes of South East Asia.  
The ethnographic actions of the missionaries were an effort to understand the 
cultural differences inhibiting widespread conversion to Christianity.  Catholic 
missionaries were the first westerners to provide a group identity to the indigenous 
tribes of the Central Highlands, creating the germination of nationalism among the 
hill tribes where no common nationalist identity existed before. 
                                                          
35 Chapus, A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc, 181–188. 
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The Montagnards are a grouping of aborigines of Malyo-Polynesian and Mon-
Khmer linguistic stock.36  Cultural anthropologists tend to agree37 that this “…mosaic 
of races and cultures is the world’s most ethnically complex.”38   The ancient 
ancestors of these aborigines migrated from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pacific islands 
into the low country of Vietnam.39  As the Kinh, modern day Vietnamese, migrated 
south from southern China, they pushed these early inhabitants into the mountains 
where they established primitive cultures that exist today.40  All Montagnards share 
common cultural, and physical attributes that allow them to be easily identified as 
Montagnards, but the linguistic differences that exist between villages is what truly 
distinguishes these indigenous peoples into a complicated mosaic of ethnic 
identity.41     
The basic Montagnard political structure is village focused.  Amateur 
anthropologists serving within the French colonial bureaucracy and Catholic 
missionaries attempted to classify these indigenous peoples in tribes, but finding 
little commonality among the various villages resorted to classifying each tribe based 
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on linguistic similarities.42  Early explorers and colonizers of the North American 
continent experienced similar difficulties among the Native Americans.  Even among 
the larger Montagnard tribes, little political commonality existed, which limited 
common identity among the tribes for most of their existence.  
Each village had its own tribal chief who represents the village during 
meetings to resolve disputes over land, property, or during the political linking of 
villages through the marriage process.  These chiefs led in direct consultation with 
the local shaman or sorcerer who directed village worship, conducted physical 
healing, and protected the village from evil spirits. Montagnard villages tended to be 
self-sufficient in practicing the agricultural technique of swidden farming, or slash 
and burn.  Agricultural production was supplemented with hunting and fishing to 
diversify the Montagnard diet.  Due to their village self-sufficiency, little trade 
existed among different Montagnard villages or with their lowland neighbors. In 
some cases, however, some larger villages did develop economic ties with local 
Vietnamese Mandarins seeking to expand their political and economic influence into 
the Central Highlands.  Because of the village-centered focus of the Montagnards 
and their economic self-sufficiency, each village was concerned with their immediate 
environment, staying isolated in their traditional village and rarely venturing outside 
of that environment.  The limited contact Montagnards had with the outside world 
before the introduction of Catholic missionaries into the Central Highlands in the 
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1830s and 1840s43 kept Montagnard political identity focused on the village.44 The 
introduction of missionaries into the Central Highlands introduced western ideals of 
political and religious identity to the Montagnards.  This new identity introduced by 
Catholic missionaries focused on religious identity within the Catholic Church, 
initiating the reorganization of the village centered tribes into communities 
stretching beyond the limits of the local familial village.       
In 1825 the second Nguyen ruler, Emperor Minh Mang, issued an anti-
Catholic edict that prohibited the teaching of the Catholic faith and instituted a 
violent campaign to remove Catholic missionaries from the country in response to 
missionary-led rebellions that challenged Vietnamese sovereignty.45 Seeking refuge 
from this religious persecution, French missionaries desired to establish a safe haven 
in the Annamite Mountains among the indigenous peoples.  The first recorded 
interaction between French missionaries and the indigenous peoples of the 
highlands came in 1830 when Father Père Gagelin requested the assistance of Sen-
Fi, a Cambodian Mandarin with relationships with the native population, to arrange 
a meeting between a native inhabitant and Father Gagelin.46   
Father Gagelin’s purpose was to begin understanding the indigenous people’s 
habits in an effort to start active proselytizing among the native peoples.   Father 
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Gagelin, through an interpreter provided by the Sen-Fi, began to pepper the 
Montagnard tribesman with questions attempting to explore the lack of contact 
between Montagnards and the lowland Vietnamese.  Gagelin felt that Montagnards 
should open their traditionally secluded villages and actively engage themselves in 
the development of a modern society.  This would allow missionaries to use 
conversion to the Catholic faith as a mean to civilize the primitive inhabitants of the 
Central Highlands. In response, the young Montagnard replied “When we appear in 
open landscape, we become afraid; but when we are in the bush, in the midst of 
tigers and other wild beasts, we are in safety.”47 Gagelin did not understand the 
Montagnards’ desire to stay secluded and avoid living outside their traditional village 
centered environment passed down from their ancestors.  As missionaries began to 
retreat into the highlands, they found various primitive villages at different levels of 
social and political development.  The larger villages typically controlled the political 
situation in the Central Highlands, exercising domination over the smaller villages, 
conducting raids to exact tribute, and promoting an active slave trade in South East 
Asia.  Some of the villages had formed strategic partnerships based on proximity and 
linguistic commonality. These partnerships can be best described as tribes, like the 
Rhade and Jarai who conducted regular trading with Vietnamese merchants and 
kept a tribute relationship with the Nguyen dynasty located in the ancient capital 
city of Hue.  This tribute relationship promised protection to these tribes, but also a 
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certain level of political and social autonomy that kept the natives in the mountains 
secluded from the hated Vietnamese.48    
When the universe was created, the God Yang Bot married the goddess Yang 
Gia and they had two sons.  The older son was restless, always desiring to run and 
play and get into trouble, while the younger son was loyal to his parents, seeking to 
earn their respect and admiration.  As these two sons grew older, the older son 
would disappear into the jungle, hunting and fishing and living off the land for years 
at a time, while the younger son remained at home to care for his parents and fulfill 
his responsibilities.  Yang Gia, the mother, became sad due to her first child’s 
actions, causing her illness and ultimate death.  When the older son returned from 
his long absence, his father, Yang Bot, verbally accosted him: “You bad son, your 
mother died because of you.  Why have you come back?”  The older son talked back 
to his father, explaining he had gone on a trip, and asking how he killed his mother in 
his absence.  Angered by the older sons’ attitude, Yang Bot struck the older son with 
a stick and chased him into the jungle, where the older son found a sanctuary away 
from his father.49 
Yang Bot ignored his prodigal son, focusing his time and energy in developing 
his younger son.  His younger son proved adept at acquiring new skills, married, and 
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began to raise a family that quickly spread to inhabit the entire lowland areas.  
Seeing the success of his younger son made Yang Bot proud, but sad that his older 
son was not developing the same way.  Growing older, Yang Bot left his lowland 
descendants and ventured into the mountains to search for his older son.  Yang Bot 
found his older son and his posterity and grew worried about their lack of progress.  
He quickly invented a dialect, and taught them how to use the spear and arrow to 
hunt and protect themselves from wild beasts. Not being able to adapt to the 
mountain climate, Yang Bot passed away before he could teach his older son the 
advanced ways of society.  From this time forward the older son and his posterity 
became the indigenous peoples of the Central Highlands, while the younger son and 
his posterity became the lowland Vietnamese.  Due to their different dialects they 
could not understand one another and avoided contact.  The Montagnards remained 
in the protection of the mountains, while the Vietnamese remained in the lowlands, 
flourishing as a society.50   
This story relates through oral history the origins of the Bahnar tribe, but 
similar stories exist among other Montagnard tribes of the Central Highlands.  These 
stories provide a specific identity that depicts the racial antipathy that exists 
between the Vietnamese and Montagnards, helping to create an identity by defining 
what it means to be Montagnard. Father Gagelin’s ethnographic journey into the 
exotic world of the native inhabitants of the Central Highlands would be cut short 
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upon his arrest and execution in 1833 for violation of Emperor Minh Mang’s edict.  
Gagelin became the 19th century rationale for military intervention to stop the 
persecution of Catholics in Vietnam, but that intervention would not occur until 
1847.51  Seeking a safe base of operation for the spreading of Christianity, Catholic 
missionaries selected the Central Highland region of Kontum for its isolation from 
Vietnamese political control as the location to establish a sanctuary to allow 
converts and missionaries to escape the Vietnamese persecution.  
With increasing persecution, Catholic leaders in Vietnam sought to build a 
mission in the Central Highlands that would place them outside the political reach of 
the Mandarins who were administering the anti-Catholic policies of the Mang court.  
Shortly after the execution of Father Gagelin, the Catholic bishop in Qui-Nhon, 
Bishop Cuénot, began to actively explore the creation of a Catholic mission secluded 
in the mountains. Cuénot began to send missionaries to the highlands to build 
relationships with the highlanders and document their political and social structures 
for the benefit of Christianity.52  Cuénot and his missionaries became acquainted 
with the Jarai tribe and their leader, the Master of Fire,53 who maintained tributary 
and commercial rights with the Mang court of Annam located in Hue.  Catholic 
missionaries sent to the Jarai found that the Vietnamese traders who maintained the 
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regional stability for the benefit of economic gain would be the most difficult 
obstacle to establishing a mission.  In 1842, Catholic priests Duclos and Miche were 
arrested by the Vietnamese traders and imprisoned at Hue in accordance with the 
law.  Accused of fomenting rebellion, Duclos, Miche, and three other French priests 
were sentenced to death but were released in 1843 because of the military 
intervention of the French Asiatic fleet.  At least two more attempts to establish 
missions in the highlands were undertaken in Quang-Ngai and Quang-Nam, both 
failing.  It was not until 1848 when a Vietnamese priest, Father Do, familiar with 
Montagnard custom and languages, was able to gain the trust of an influential 
Bahnar village leader and establish a mission in the Bahnar area of Kontum along the 
banks of the river Bla.54  
As missionaries moved into the central highlands, they found it difficult to 
communicate with the Montagnards because there was no comprehensive material 
to assist missionaries in learning the different village / tribal dialects.  The lack of a 
documented vernacular, similar to that created by Alexandre de Rhodes in the 17th 
century, hampered the success of the early missionary incursions into the highlands.  
But the missionaries, persuaded by Vietnamese persecution in the lowlands, 
dedicated their time in the highlands to learning the vernacular languages of the 
tribes. They documented these languages in an effort to create materials to assist 
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incoming missionaries learning tribal languages. 55  The development of tribal 
language learning tools quickened the ethnographic process performed by the 
missionaries by allowing language barriers to be broken.  Catholic missionaries used 
their ability to communicate with the highlanders as a means to document tribal life.  
These documentations created a consistent image of the Montagnards that were 
used by Catholic missionaries, and later by French colonial administrators, to create 
an exotic identity of indigenous people in South East Asia.  As westerners became 
acquainted with the Montagnards through these descriptions, Montagnards utilized 
these new resources to teach each other how to read and write, furthering 
Montagnard development in a modern society.  These vernacular writings would be 
viewed as a threat by President Ngo Dinh Diem, who outlawed the teaching of 
Montagnard history and language, ordering the destruction of these materials, 
angering Montagnards who accused Diem of cultural annihilation.  
With the arrival of French missionaries into the Central Highlands, the 
missionaries began to document their observations of the Bahnar and other tribes 
and villages they came in contact with.  The purpose of these ethnographic studies 
was to help the missionaries become acquainted with tribal customs and taboos and 
use this knowledge to demonstrate to the Montagnards their primitive ways. The 
intention was to help civilize them through conversion to Catholicism. Through 
ethnography, Catholic missionaries were able to develop a written identity of the 
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Bahnar and other smaller villages in the Kontum region.  But it was the political and 
military organization of these villages led by Father Guerlach in the 1880s to combat 
the larger Jarai and Sedang tribal villages that endeared the missionaries to these 
local tribes.56 This sowed the seeds of an expanding Montagnard tribal identity 
through political and military organization against other larger tribal villages.  
Early missionary accounts describe the natives as “good for nothing savages, 
who were childlike, evil, violent, and not to be trusted.”57  Missionaries believed that 
the Montagnards were under the influence of black magic and were an inferior 
civilization compared to the Vietnamese.  European missionaries agreed that the 
only way to arrest the decline of the indigenous populations was through civilization 
through conversion to the Catholic faith.   As missionaries began to experience 
minimal success among the Montagnards, statistical reports began to be recorded 
documenting the number of baptisms, confessions, the number of schools created 
and their attendance records.  These numbers were compared to the number of 
tribal / village members who had not yet shunned their pagan lifestyles and 
converted to Catholicism.  Missionaries began to use western idea of census 
gathering to ascertain the strength of the church among the indigenous peoples.  By 
gathering this data, missionaries introduced a practice of modern state identity by 
combining villages into tribes based on similar linguistics characteristics and 
proximity. The Catholic missionary legacy of ethnography laid the foundation that 
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would be continued with the expansion of French colonialism in the late 19th 
century.  This expansion saw a more scientific approach to ethnography among the 
indigenous tribes that contributed to the overall identity developed under the 
French moniker Montagnards.        
    French colonialist ethnography of the indigenous populations was an 
amateur affair for most of France’s colonial experiment in Vietnam.  In 1898 the 
Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO) was founded in the northern city of Hanoi.  
Full time ethnographers were not established at the EFEO until 1937, which limited 
French understanding of the native populations to the records created by 
missionaries, military personnel, and French explorers.  Due to the amateur nature 
of the ethnographic methods, early French material on the Montagnards analyzed 
their culture, religion, and languages through a western prism and categorized the 
Montagnards as savages.  The EFEO published in 1900 a manual providing the 
amateur ethnographer with basic guidelines to establish a scientific approach to the 
categorizing of the indigenous populations of Vietnam.  The Carnet d’instruction 
pour les collaborateurs de l’Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient proposed linguistics 
classifications for the various mountain tribes by documenting a standard vocabulary 
with accompanying transcription. This was created to help the researcher identify 
the race of the people being studied through linguistic mapping.58 Included in the 
volume was direction on how to create a proper ethnographic observation record, 
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which was comprised of thirteen section headings for the report: generalities, 
habitation, clothing, nutrition, hunting and fishing, means of transport, culture, 
commerce, industry, war, society, art, and religion.59 
The ability to classify and understand the inhabitants of a particular area 
allows for the subjugation of those peoples under a specific form of government.  
During the early 20th century, multiple ethnographic reports were created and sent 
to the EFEO, some being published in various academic journals.  The increase in the 
number of reports coincidentally coincides with instructions from the Governor 
General of French-Indochina to collect as much ethnographic material on the 
mountain tribesman as possible.  Subsequently as more data on the tribesman were 
collected, the French began to assume more governmental control over the 
highlanders by supplanting the traditional Vietnamese administrative structure that 
had been in place since the mid-19th century.   
In 1863 Emperor Tu Duc instituted a military pacification program called Son 
Phong.  This program was established to mollify the tribal discontent in the 
highlands caused by Vietnamese abuse of the indigenous tribes.  As the program 
matured, it became the primary source of government administration, soon growing 
into an exploitive program that economically took advantage of the indigenous 
populations through the lumber and slave trades.  This economic exploitation 
fanned the ethnic tension that already existed between the Montagnards and 
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Vietnamese, resulting in a number of raids on Vietnamese villages to protest the 
abusive policies of the Vietnamese administration and military occupation. The 
abusive policies pursued by Vietnamese administrators created a difficult situation 
among the Montagnards in the Central Highlands, providing French colonialists with 
the justification to expand direct control over the agriculturally fertile Central 
Highlands.60     
In 1898, Paul Doumer arrived in Vietnam to assume the post of Governor 
General.  Doumer instituted a plan to increase French control of the major 
population centers of Vietnam and the rural areas of French Annam.  Doumer 
increased French control of the Central Highlands by reorganizing the Son Phong, 
effectively dismantling the organization and establishing “[French] supervised 
markets; the collection of monetary taxes; the right to request corvée labor; the 
interdiction to use fire or sound signals; and the possibility for Frenchmen to acquire 
land concessions for plantations.”61 This directly affected the Vietnamese that 
facilitated the daily administration of the Central Highlands, depriving members of 
the Son Phong of the political and financial graft they received for allowing the 
exploitation of the highland peoples. With the abolition of the Son Phong, 
Montagnard attacks on Vietnamese villages increased, creating a difficult political 
transition from Vietnamese administration to French colonial administration. 
                                                          
60 Gerald C. Hickey, Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 
1954, 273–275. 
61 Salemink, The Ethnography of Vietnam’s Central Highlanders: A Historical Contextualization, 
1850–1900, 76. 
33 
Explanations for the motivation behind the increase in Montagnard attacks are 
many, but two arguments emerge as the most realistic reasons for the increase in 
indigenous attacks on lowland Vietnamese villages. First, the former Vietnamese 
administrators are accused of inciting the attacks to create political discontent and 
force the French to reinstate the Son Phong as the economic and political base.  This 
would allow select Vietnamese administrators to benefit financially at the expense 
of the indigenous population, further creating discontent and racial antipathy 
between the Vietnamese majority and Montagnard minority.  Second, the 
Montagnards used the transition period to avenge the abuse they had experienced 
under Vietnamese administration.62  Montagnard revenge appears to be the most 
accurate reason for the increase in attacks.  Vietnamese abuse combined with 
French ethnographic classification began to instill the idea of a Montagnard 
“imagined community,” creating the first instances of nationalism among the 
highlanders of Vietnam.  The French bureaucrat Leopold Sabatier would have a 
profound effect on the creation on Montagnard nationalism by attempting to 
understand and catalogue Montagnard culture from a tribal perspective instead of 
through a western lens.  Sabatier practiced cultural relativism, an anthropological 
idea categorized in the 1970s, but practiced by Sabatier in the Central Highlands of 
Vietnam in the early 20th century.   
Leopold Sabatier arrived in French Indochina in 1903 as a low level civil 
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servant.  Disliking the humid lowlands, Sabatier requested a transfer to the 
mountain region of French Annam.   Sabatier experienced firsthand the detrimental 
effects experienced by the Montagnards who were forced by Catholic missionaries 
to give up the primordial ties for a civilized Christian lifestyle.   Sabatier felt that the 
complete abandonment of primordial ties was unnecessary and that the 
Montagnards could modernize their political process by recording and publishing 
tribal political and judicial structure that would allow indigenous leaders to govern 
their tribes based on uniform legal code.   In 1913 Sabatier was provided the 
opportunity to implement his ideas among the Rhade tribe in the newly created 
district known as Darlac. 
Understanding the dangers of outside forces attempting to culturally 
assimilate the indigenous tribes, Sabatier actively kept the Vietnamese, Christian 
missionaries, and French businessmen out of Darlac district.  This allowed Sabatier to 
separate the Rhade tribe, effectively creating a “human reserve”63 to protect 
Montagnard culture.  Sabatier viewed the Rhade and other indigenous tribes as 
children, in need of a father who could guide them, protect them, and teach them 
how to govern themselves.  He did this first through the creation of the Franco-
Rhade school in the district center of Ban Me Thuot.  Children attending the school 
would receive instruction in the “French language, history and geography, as well as 
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in Rhade culture.”64 As the school progressed, it was led by the French headmaster, 
Dominique Antomarchi, who trained Rhade teachers to conduct the daily classes in 
French and in Rhade.  To facilitate the teaching of the Rhade language, Antomarchi 
created a Romanized Rhade script that supplanted the use of the Vietnamese script 
taught in the majority of schools throughout Vietnam.  Through the creation of an 
active education system, Sabatier created a healthy environment that prepared 
Rhade tribal members to contribute to the overall facilitation of government.  This 
prepared the educated members of the Rhade to protect their people by 
understanding political administration.   
Sabatier contributed to the creation of Montagnard identity by transferring 
the legal system from an oral tradition to written.  This gave credence to the 
Montagnard legal system by codifying the legal tradition and translating and 
publishing it in French in 1919.  Sabatier embarked on the creation of Montagnard 
legal text to protect the indigenous people from the Vietnamese and French 
economic forces attempting to exploit the highlanders who they believed did not 
have a legal tradition.  The legal codex created by Sabatier did modify Montagnard 
law, placing a western interpretation on aspects of the law.65  Subsequent French 
administrations modified or reinterpreted the law for their benefit.  The 
establishment of this legal tradition, though tainted by western influence, 
contributed to the rise of Montagnard nationalism.  President Ngo Dinh Diem’s 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 Ngo Duc Thinh, “Traditional Law of the Ede (Rhade),” Asian Folklore Studies, 59, (2000), 90. 
36 
policy of Montagnard judicial dismemberment angered Montagnard nationalists, 
who demanded its reinstitution as a concession for Montagnard loyalty to the Saigon 
government.   
French ethnography, the creation of an educational system, and the 
codification of highland law all contributed to the rise of Montagnard nationalism by 
providing a common identity among the various tribes.  But the primary French 
contribution to Montagnard nationalism was the creation in 1946 of a 
semiautonomous state governed by Montagnards under French supervision.  This 
newly created French area was known as the Pays Montagnard Du Sud Indochinois 
(PMSI) or the Montagnard country of South Indochina.  The PMSI encompassed the 
highland provinces of Darlac, Haut-Donnai, Lang-Bian, and Kontum.  The most 
northern border of this area ended along the 17th parallel, east to the Annamite 
mountain range, west to the Laotian and Cambodian borders, and south to the 
Cochin China border, or the border with the southern third of Vietnam. 
By specifying the particular boundaries of the PMSI, the French inadvertently 
created the modern Montagnard Geo-body identity through territoriality, or the 
creation of a modern state where one did not exist before.  By 1950 the French grew 
concerned about Montagnard capacity to govern and created the Domain de la 
Couronne or Crown Domain under the control of Emperor Bao Dai.  This gradual loss 
of autonomy did not cause much consternation among the Montagnards, who 
continued to serve the Emperor and the French colonialists against communist 
37 
forces during the French Indochina war.  Emperor Bao Dai was an aloof leader 
spending most of his time hunting tigers and living a lavish lifestyle in his mountain 
retreat in Dalat and the French Riviera.  This allowed the Montagnards to govern 
themselves with the support of French bureaucrats, free of the Vietnamese who had 
historically taken advantage of them.  With the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954 
and the signing of the Geneva accords, Montagnard nationalism would be 
accelerated, motivated by the culturally destructive unification policies of President 












CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND MONTAGNARD NATIONALISM 
 
 
President Diem arrived in Vietnam from his self-imposed exile in June of 
1954.  He was selected by the United States to serve as Emperor Bao Dai’s Prime 
Minister, until reunification elections could occur in 1956 that would allow the 
people of Vietnam to choose their national destiny.  Diem quickly set about 
consolidating power within South Vietnam through political strong arming and 
bribery supported by Edward Lansdale and the CIA.  By 1955 Diem was the primary 
political force in South Vietnam.  Under the guise of Vietnamese nationalism, Diem 
beat Bao Dai in the 1955 presidential elections, garnering an astounding 98 
percent66 of the popular vote.  Diem created an authoritarian regime surrounded by 
members of his family and Catholic confidants that were awarded for loyalty over 
competence.  The political mismanagement of the Diem years would exacerbate the 
issue of Montagnard nationalism through policies that specifically targeted the 
indigenous population of the Central Highlands for cultural assimilation. 
 As part of the Geneva accords, the Vietnamese people had the choice to 
relocate north or south of the internationally selected boundary of the 17th parallel. 
                                                          




Catholic and anti-communist Vietnamese numbering approximately 1,000,00067 left 
their homes in North Vietnam and migrated south to develop a better life in South 
Vietnam.  This large influx of refugees strained the limited infrastructure in place in 
South Vietnam, forcing the Diem government to act quickly to stabilize this large 
body of refugees looking to develop a new life.  Diem desperately needed land to 
redistribute to these refugees, and that land he found in the sparsely populated 
Central Highlands that constituted roughly two-thirds68 of South Vietnam, but 
housed only five percent69 of the total population of 17 million.  The influx of 
Vietnamese into the highlands of Vietnam reignited ancient racial antipathy 
between the Vietnamese and Montagnards and elevated these antipathies to the 
forefront of the political situation in South Vietnam.   
 The majority of land in South Vietnam was owned by absentee landowners 
who had retired to France and other European countries during the French and 
Indochina war.  These owners charged their tenants an unsustainable 50% to 70%70 
of the total crop yields, providing barely enough subsistence for the farmer to feed 
his or her family or provide a surplus to sell at the local agricultural markets.  Before 
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Ngo Dinh Diem was elected President, there was no law protecting tenants from the 
abuse by land owners or from the produce brokers who would take advantage of 
these illiterate farmers at the local agricultural markets.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that approximately 85 percent71 of Vietnam’s population 
lived in rural villages that derived their subsistence from agricultural employment.  
With the influx of close to 1,000,000 North Vietnamese refugees, a comprehensive 
land policy had to be established to increase the standard of living among the 
population of South Vietnam through a viable economic agricultural market. 
 President Diem created the office of Secretariat of State for Land Property 
and Agrarian Reform on May 10, 1955.  He empowered this newly created office 
with broad powers to “use every possible means to carry out the land programs and 
to make up for lost time.”72 Diem granted broad powers to the new Secretariat of 
State as a means to punish those wealthy land owners that aligned loyalties behind 
other candidates than Diem during the political consolidation of power in 1954 and 
1955.  Diem’s land reform policy had two phases. The first phase created policies 
that would protect the tenant farmer from the previous practice of high rent and 
other general abuse heaped upon the tenant by the landowners.  This phase of land 
reform policy had little effect on the indigenous populations of the Central 
Highlands, who continued to live and farm on their tribal lands with little disturbance 
from the government.  
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The second phase focused on the redistribution of lands from wealthy land 
owners, who were paid below market price for their land by the central government.  
The government resold the purchased land to Vietnamese peasants in small lots of 
three to five hectares.73  The government did not recognize Montagnard land rights, 
treating tribal land as government-owned land that could be distributed without 
consultation with Montagnard leaders.  The Vietnamese erroneously believed that 
the Montagnards were nomadic tribes who did not have claim to any of the land in 
the Central highlands.  A succinct Montagnard land tenure system (Po Lan) was 
discovered and reported to the government by Gerald C. Hickey, a member of the 
Michigan State University advisory group to Vietnam, and Price Gittinger, an advisor 
with the United States Operations Mission (USOM) Agricultural Division studying the 
possible detrimental effects the land redistribution program might have on the 
Montagnards.  Gittinger and Hickey turned in two separate reports acknowledging a 
Montagnard land tenure system.  President Diem and other officials rejected the 
report’s findings and refused to meet with Montagnards to negotiate a resolution to 
government claims of Montagnard lands.74   The second phase brought Montagnards 
and the Vietnamese into direct contention over the issue of land rights.  With the 
rapid reintroduction of Vietnamese into the Central Highlands, President Diem 
began a concerted effort to eliminate Montagnard primordial ties by replacing them 
with Vietnamese customs.  Diem pursued a common misconception among leaders 
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of newly independent former South East Asian colonies that primordial ties could 
not be integrated into a new national identity, but had to be eliminated and 
replaced with a common national identity. These actions, coupled with ancient 
abuses, were soon to bring a simmering discontent to a full boil. These were the 
chief circumstances that led to a series of destructive events affecting political 
instability in the Highlands, precursory to the Vietnam War. 
After the October 1955 South Vietnamese Presidential elections, Ngo Dinh 
Diem acted quickly to begin eliminating Montagnard primordial ties.  He replaced 
French-supported Montagnard administrators in the Central Highlands with 
Vietnamese bureaucrats, who governed the indigenous populations with an iron fist.  
The Vietnamese referred to the Montagnards as Moi, or savages, and refused to 
respect indigenous customs, laws, and social mores.  Vietnamese administrators 
eliminated the tribal legal system, requiring that all Montagnard legal issues be 
handled according to Vietnamese jurisprudence.  Indigenous languages were 
removed from the education system in an attempt to eradicate tribal languages, 
forcing students to study in Vietnamese.  Educational materials written in the 
traditional tribal dialects were destroyed and replaced with Vietnamese language 
textbooks.  Members of the thirteen Montagnard military battalions, who served 
during the French Indochina war, were disbanded and their members transferred to 
different Vietnamese military units to weaken Montagnard military capabilities.  
Indigenous officers were relieved of command and replaced with Vietnamese 
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military officers, and all Montagnard military personnel were forced to adopt 
Vietnamese names.  Along with these policies of cultural assimilation, the 
Montagnard people experienced general segregation and racial prejudice by the 
incoming Vietnamese nationals who verbally berated, physically abused, and 
economically exploited the indigenous population.75   
Many Americans serving among the Montagnards compared Vietnamese 
treatment of the indigenous population to “… much like segregation in the American 
South”76 and that “The Vietnamese treat the [Montagnards] as a lower social 
order.”77 Other American personnel compared the plight of the native populations 
of South Vietnam to the Native Americans who were driven from their land and 
forced to assimilate into American culture.  Wesley Fishel, chief advisor to the 
Michigan State University advisory group to Vietnam (MSUG), requested information 
in 1956 from the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C. to gather ideas on how 
to manage the issues of the Montagnards in South Vietnam.  The combination of the 
government’s policies of land redistribution, relocation, and cultural annihilation 
motivated Montagnard leaders to create the BAJARAKA movement, the first 
comprehensive Montagnard attempt at nationalism.  
The creation of an “imagined community” requires the motivation on the part 
of a vocal leader to categorize the meaning of the newly created community.  Using 
the current political situation as instigation, this leader will begin to recruit 
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disaffected members among his or her immediate relationships to foment a 
nationalist movement.  With the introduction of the government’s cultural 
assimilation policies in 1955, Y Thih Eban emerged as the vocal leader who organized 
political discussions in the Rhade village of Buon Ale-A, laying the foundation for the 
recruitment and growth of the Montagnard nationalist movement.  These early 
meetings began as simple discussions, allowing invited members to voice their 
grievances against Diem’s antihighlander policies in a safe environment. Such 
discussions evolved into the development of the idea of what it meant to be a 
Montagnard.  
Y Thih Eban invited the educated elite to attend and participate in these 
meetings, using the discontent caused by the government’s assimilation policies as 
the primary tool or recruitment.  After several meetings the attending members 
proposed the creation of Le Front pour la Libération des Montagnards, or FLM.  
Though small in size the FLM drafted the first letter outlining the abusive nature of 
President Diem’s policies.  This letter was sent to President Diem, but no response 
from Diem addressing the list of grievances has ever been recorded.  The FLM 
continued to meet, but did not address the growing political discontent among the 
Highland peoples any further than the initial 1955 letter to President Diem.  In 1957 
many of the Highland administrative organizations were abruptly reorganized, 
reassigning the members of FLM to different provinces.  Each of these newly 
relocated members of FLM became vocal leaders, recruiting new members to their 
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cause. These members went about establishing clandestine nationalist groups that 
met frequently to discuss the idea of Montagnard nationalism.  Among the new 
members of these clandestine groups was a Rhade tribesman, Y Bham Enuol, a well-
known civil servant lauded for his educational prowess and political skill.   
Y Bham Enuol and other educated Montagnard teachers and civil servants 
flocked to the FLM, willing to share stories of alienation and racial segregation at the 
hands of the ever increasing Vietnamese population in the Central Highlands.  With 
the growth of the FLM it became necessary to organize a leadership structure that 
would allow for the mobilization of the groups’ members to further the political 
cause of Montagnard nationalism.  Early in 1958 a central committee was formed 
naming Y Bham Enuol as president of the committee because he was the oldest in 
the group.  Along with the formation of a central committee, representatives were 
selected to represent each province, city, and village establishing a succinct political 
organization advocating for the rights of Montagnards. During the consolidation and 
organization of the FLM, it was proposed to rename the group BAJARAKA, an 
acronym derived from the first two letters of each of the four major tribes 
represented in the group: Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade (Rade), and Kaho (Koho).  
With the creation of the BAJARAKA movement, a formal list of grievances was 
documented to establish the purpose behind the movement.  The document was 
drafted with various section headings detailing the poor treatment of Highlanders by 
the government.  The first grievance listed was the consternation caused among the 
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Montagnards at the loss of their semiautonomous political zone under the French 
colonial administration.  Complaints against pay discrimination, the abolition of 
highland courts, land redistribution, and general wanton destruction of highland 
culture and customs perpetrated by the government completed the document.78 
The formalization of the BAJARAKA manifesto established what it meant to be part 
of the Montagnard nationalist community, by distinguishing the “negative identity”79 
between Montagnards and Vietnamese. The policy of cultural assimilation pursued 
by Diem and his political allies toward minorities was consistent with the policies 
pursued by other political leaders in India, Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia; leaders 
who attempted “…a gradual absorption of the minority tribes into the national 
community…”80 These other nations sought to eliminate primordial ties and replace 
them with new nationalist ties to the state.  
The communist government in Hanoi pursued a different policy towards the 
ethnic minorities of Vietnam focusing on cultural integrity and the establishment of 
autonomous political zones situated around the communist political model of loyalty 
to the party.  Ho Chi Minh and the communist Politburo identified the ethnic 
minorities inhabiting the mountainous borders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as 
key strategic partners in their struggle to reunite Vietnam and expel the “puppet” 
Ngo Dinh Diem government in Saigon.  The infamous Ho Chi Minh trail, used to 
                                                          
78 Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands 1954–1976, 54–55. 
79 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, 5. 
80 Viet Minh, 1957 Folder 08, Box 12, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06 – Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
The Vietnam Center and Archive: Texas Tech University, 13. 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=23212080002 Accessed April 5, 2013  
47 
infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam, weaved through indigenous tribal 
lands along the borders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Seeking to avoid a 
disruption of supplies, Hanoi attempted to garner the loyalty of these ethnic 
minorities to protect their supply lines supporting the communist cause in the south.  
The policies pertaining to ethnic minorities pursued by Hanoi mirrored similar ethnic 
minority policies implemented in both Soviet Russia and Communist China. 
Understanding the importance of uniting under a common moniker to 
establish an ever growing nationalist base, but allowing for the retention of native 
identity within the party’s structure, General Vo Nguyen Giap outlined the political 
policies of the communist regime toward Vietnam’s minorities: “The aim of the 
nationalities of the Lao-Dong Party is to enable all national groups to achieve 
equality, unity, progress, and prosperity.”81  Not only were the native Vietnamese 
important to the communist cause, but so were the ethnic minorities.  Ho Chi Minh 
was willing to allow minorities to retain their indigenous identity in exchange for 
their loyalty to the cause of reunification. 
The primary focus of Hanoi’s policies was the creation of autonomous areas 
“…in which the various nationality groups are reportedly given an opportunity to 
develop themselves…”82 Hanoi would provide support and protection for these 
minority groups, but, not willing to surrender all political control, Hanoi did 
implement guidelines that each autonomous area had to abide by.  This policy was a 
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continuation of the French divide and rule policy that encouraged individual group 
autonomy at the expense of ethnic unification across linguistic and tribal lines. 
By setting up autonomous areas, the communist government practiced 
“balanced favoritism,”83 which allowed the government to perpetuate traditional 
antagonisms among ethnic groups to weaken individual groups that would demand 
greater political influence united under a single cause of ethnic autonomy.  Not 
wanting to fight an armed rebellion in their rear while prosecuting an escalating war 
in the south, Ho Chi Minh wanted to eliminate domestic political situations that 
could distract the government away from its primary purpose of unifying the 
country.  Even with certain rights granted to the minorities living in these 
autonomous zones, each zone had to pursue the communist cause by creating and 
maintaining regular military and paramilitary forces; developing communist cadres 
that could help keep members of the region in line with communist views; and 
support Ho Chi Minh, the communist party, and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam.84  Communists in Hanoi paid lip service to many of the ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam, even enticing some to migrate north in 1954 and 1955.  But these policies 
granted limited autonomy, not the full autonomy sought by the ethnic minorities 
who wanted to govern based on tradition and tribal customs. Even though ethnic 
minorities had to govern within the communist apparatus, they were granted 
specific rights that were not granted by the South Vietnamese government until 
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after the armed rebellion in September of 1964.  
In 1946 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s constitution had guaranteed 
minorities’ equal protection under the law and the right to an education in their 
native language.  The tribal groups had a right to political representation within the 
national assembly and the guaranteed use of their native language in legal 
proceedings.  These basic rights were outlawed by Diem, who sought to punish the 
ethnic minorities for their collusion with the French colonialists.  Even with a more 
articulate ethnic minority policy, Hanoi’s actual success among minorities is difficult 
to ascertain.  Hanoi’s policies decreased the threat of ethnic rebellions, allowing 
Hanoi to focus on the ideological struggle in South Vietnam.  The communists 
actively recognized the polyethnic makeup of their country and sought policies that 
furthered the communist cause while building a national identity.  
 Ethnic minorities in North Vietnam did not obtain complete autonomy, but 
they appeared to have had a better political relationship with Hanoi than they had 
with Saigon.  One of the primary reasons more Montagnards did not migrate north 
was because of their loyalty to ancestral villages and land.  Also, the majority of 
Montagnards did not believe the Vietnamese, north or south could be trusted.  If the 
North’s policies towards ethnic minorities were as good as they were portrayed to 
be, it would lead an individual to believe there would have been a large migration 
north to participate within the political structure established for ethnic minorities by 
the government in Hanoi. The lack of migration is a testament to the limited ability 
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of the North Vietnamese government to gain the trust of minorities.  While the 
government in Hanoi was experiencing relative calm among its minorities, President 
Diem and the South Vietnamese government continued to struggle with rising 
antigovernment sentiment among the Montagnards of the Central Highlands 
contributing to the rise of Montagnard nationalism. 
In August and September 1958, leaders of BAJARAKA drafted a letter 
demanding political autonomy from the Saigon government, appealing directly to 
foreign ambassadors to support the cause of Montagnard autonomy.  Political 
pressure was placed on the BAJARAKA movement through arbitrary arrests.  The 
BAJARAKA central committee opposed these arrests, appealing to President Diem to 
release the imprisoned BAJARAKA members and requesting government 
representatives to convene a meeting to address the concerns of the highland 
peoples.  Diem quickly mobilized his security forces to detain the BAJARAKA central 
committee, placing them in solitary confinement in a Pleiku prison.  Members of the 
group organized a peaceful protest on October 12, 1958, in response to the 
imprisonment of its central committee.  Fearing political discontent, President Diem 
dispatched the 23rd Armored Division to quell the protest.  With the overwhelming 
show of Vietnamese military force the protest ended peacefully, without a shot 
being fired.  President Diem retaliated further by confiscating traditional weapons 
from the highlanders to punish them for their support of the BAJARAKA 
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movement.85 Most of the BAJARAKA central committee remained in political prison 
until 1964, effectively quieting Montagnard nationalist overtones until American 
intervention in 1961 with the creation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 
which replaced Montagnard traditional weapons with modern military rifles and 
modern military tactics. Such were proven effective in combating communist 
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THE RISING THREAT OF COMMUNISM AND THE CREATION 
OF THE CIDG 
 
 
The political and military situation in Vietnam was quickly deteriorating at the 
start of the 1960s.  Since December of 1959 South Vietnam had experienced a 
steady increase in Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare.  These activities 
included armed propaganda and leaflet distribution, and the forceful taxation of the 
population to support the communist activities to undermine the Saigon 
government. This was further exacerbated by the murder, kidnappings, ransoms, 
ambushes, and general terrorist tactics against the South Vietnamese in order to 
destroy confidence in President Ngo Dinh Diem and his administration.  According to 
the U.S. State Department, the purpose of these tactics was to “eliminate any 
semblance of GVN (Government of Vietnam) control in the rural areas…”86 Viet Cong 
terrorist attacks from 1957 through 1959 totaled 1,012,87 which is an average of 337 
attacks per year or just less than one per day.  In 1960 alone Viet Cong attacks grew
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by an unprecedented 2,100,88 which is an increase of 623 percent.  By creating 
discontent among the rural population, communist insurgents were able to create a 
shadow government and establish an area of operation that provided a strong base 
of operations to launch larger more complicated attacks against the metropolitan 
areas and government institutions.  
An insurgency is “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed 
to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”89 Insurgents 
use all necessary weapons and diplomatic measures to weaken the central 
government and accomplish their political and military aims by delegitimizing the 
central government in the hearts and minds of the populace.  The further a citizen is 
from the seat of government the more difficult it is for government policies and 
programs to reach the citizen, isolating him from progress and making him more 
susceptible to subversive tactics of the insurgents. The villages in the countryside 
provide a base of operation with an easily accessible population with limited 
loyalties to the central government.  As support for the insurgency grows the people 
provide the subversives with food and clothing, and they become part of the 
community making it difficult for military and police officials to distinguish between 
insurgent and rural residents. 
In a well-executed insurgency, the countryside is the most vulnerable to the 
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subversive tactics to destroy the confidence of the people in the government.  Due 
to their distance from the seat of administration, rural populations bear the brunt of 
insurgent strategy.  The rural populations distance from government influence and 
protection makes them vulnerable to insurgent intimidation and recruitment.  As a 
result securing the rural population must become the primary focus of any military 
or government battling an insurgency of ideology.  By securing the population, 
stability is ensured, allowing for economic development.  This removes the 
insurgency’s primary source of material and political support, forcing the insurgents 
to defend the gains they have made among the population.  By the early 1960s the 
United States was attempting to develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
program by coordinating “…military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic action…”90 programs around a common objective to secure the population 
and establish a viable South Vietnamese Government.    
In an effort to combat the rising threat of communist insurgency, President 
John F. Kennedy authorized National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52 on 
May 11, 1961. This allowed for a “program for covert actions to be carried out by the 
Central Intelligence Agency which would precede and remain in force after any 
commitment of US forces to South Vietnam.”91 The CIA understood early on the 
nature of the war in Vietnam as a political war for the hearts and minds of the 
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Vietnamese and indigenous peoples, but lacked an understanding of the depth of 
ethnic hatred that would later serve as a catalyst for rebellion. 
  Traditional American military leaders focused on the conventional side of 
warfare, fearing a cross border invasion by communist forces reminiscent of the 
North Korean invasion of South Korea in June of 1950.  The Annamite Mountain 
chain is considered the backbone of Vietnam.  1,100 kilometers long, the high 
plateau acts as the connector between the northern Red River Delta and the 
southern Mekong River Delta.  Straddling the border with Laos and Cambodia, the 
Central Highlands became the primary infiltration route for men and military 
equipment from North Vietnam in support of the communist insurgency raging in 
the south.  Because of its strategically located position along the internationally 
recognized borders with Laos and Cambodia, the Central Highlands became the 
primary focus of the American CIA in combating the communist insurgency 
inundating South Vietnam through the creation of the village defense program. 
William Colby arrived in South Vietnam in February 1959 to serve as Deputy 
Chief of Station for the CIA.  The situation in Vietnam was still relatively calm in 
1959.  Colby traveled the countryside with his young children, taking them on picnics 
in the Central Highlands and traveling to the 17th parallel to witness the flying of the 
North Vietnamese flag on the other side of the demilitarized zone.  Colby traveled 
extensively with his family during the first few years of his assignment with the CIA in 
South Vietnam noting “The only dangers we encountered on these excursions came 
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not from hostile forces but from things like a train jumping the tracks, which forced 
us to spend one night in the jungle of Central Vietnam, where the children swore 
they heard tigers, or from the huge shark that our son Carl saw circling the small 
fishing boat we once hired for a ride in the harbor of the southern island of Phu 
Quoc.”92 In fact Colby worried more about the deteriorating situation in Cambodia 
where the neutralist Prince Sihanouk was thought to be a vanguard for the spread of 
communism to Thailand and South Vietnam than he did about South Vietnam during 
his first few years in country. 
As Deputy Chief of Station in Saigon, Colby’s primary responsibility was to 
meet weekly with President Diem’s chief political advisor, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, 
and build a relationship that would allow the CIA to exercise influence over the 
decision making process of the South Vietnamese government and keep Nhu abreast 
of the CIA operations to combat the increasing communist threat.  As Colby 
conducted these weekly meetings with Nhu, mutual trust was affirmed and they 
were able to exchange personal ideas on the nature of the escalating conflict in 
South Vietnam. As the conflict began to escalate in the latter months of 1959 into 
early 1960, political forces against Diem demanded that Diem stop his repressive 
tactics, end the nepotism and corruption that was rampant in his administration, and 
grant fundamental civil rights to the citizens of South Vietnam.  Anti-Diem forces 
contended that implementing these political measures would allow the South 
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Vietnamese Government to more effectively combat the escalating communist 
insurgency. 
As communist military activity began to increase, the Diem government came 
under pressure to formulate a comprehensive plan to effectively combat the 
communist forces waging a war for the hearts and minds of the people of South 
Vietnam.  This political pressure motivated Diem to retain as much power as 
possible, becoming more autocratic in his leadership tendencies.  The increasing 
insurgency and internal political pressure on the Diem regime also started the 
American debate on the increasing role of the United States in South Vietnam, which 
“…fell to quarreling bitterly about what to do to meet the challenge….”93 Each 
United States government department associated with Vietnam had its own ideas on 
how to best combat the communist threat.  Each leader of these departments 
demonstrated extreme parochialism working to maintain their departments’ 
influence, which caused increasing friction and an inability of the United States to 
correlate their efforts to effectively combat the ideological battle being fought in 
South Vietnam.  
The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) led by General “Hanging 
Sam” Williams advocated the development of a traditional military that could 
effectively combat a full scale invasion from North Vietnam.  General Williams’ 
inability to think outside the box in combating the insurgency is a direct result of his 
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experience in World War Two and Korea, which were both conventional wars.  The 
situation in Vietnam shared many interesting parallels with the Korean War, duping 
many American officials to chase the wrong threat.  While US military leaders were 
planning for the full scale invasion that would not come until 1975, State 
Department officials were advocating for the removal of Diem from power if he did 
not adopt and implement State’s recommended reforms.  Colby, understanding the 
real battle was for the creating of a unified political identity focused on the hearts 
and minds of the South Vietnamese population, and used the political and financial 
discretion afforded him by leaders in Washington to create the Citizens Irregular 
Defense Group (CIDG), later known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, in an 
attempt to align Montagnard political identity with Saigon.   
Colby, named Chief of Station in Saigon, remained out of these turf battles 
being fought between MAAG and the Saigon Embassy.  Colby continued to meet 
with Nhu working to develop a political strategy to weaken communist influence in 
the rural villages.  Both Nhu and Colby recognized the nature of the communist 
threat as a “people’s war” where the people’s hearts and minds would be fought 
over using ideological tactics to build the necessary infrastructure to wage an armed 
conflict against the American supported government in Saigon.  The solution 
developed by Colby and his CIA staff to combat the ideological struggle in the 
countryside was the Village Defense Program that would be later named the Citizens 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG).  The Unites States Army took over the program in 
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1963 under Operation Switchback, changing the name to the Civilian Irregular 
Defense Group (CIDG).  The CIDG program employed citizens in irregular units tasked 
with the defense of a certain village or series of villages that were in the immediate 
environment of the citizens who volunteered for the program.  The familiarity of the 
local defense group with the area and local inhabitants allowed each group to isolate 
communist threats and eradicate them before they could become a political 
agitator.  But the most important aspect of this program is that it involved “…the 
villagers in the economic and social improvements that the government was 
providing and to strengthen them [villagers] so that they could help defend 
themselves against Communist pressures.”94 Colby and his team selected the 
indigenous peoples of the Central Highlands as the first to participate in this 
program.  But Colby had to receive the approval of the Ngo brothers who had 
imprisoned Montagnard nationalist leaders and confiscated Montagnards weapons 
in 1958 as punishment for supporting Montagnard nationalism and autonomy 
through the BAJARAKA movement.95   
After explaining the importance of the CIDG program and its contribution to 
the political aspect of the war by combining “…security, economic, and social 
features…”96 Nhu agreed to allow the experiment of arming the Montagnards to 
proceed, assuring Colby that President Diem would support the program. In October 
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of 1961, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles approved the Saigon CIA 
station’s village defense program.   The CIA established the first Citizens Irregular 
Defense Group camp at the tribal village of Buon Enao in December 1961 in an 
attempt to secure the rural Montagnard population from the influence of 
communist insurgents. 
The CIA was selected to manage paramilitary operations because the CIDG 
program was deemed outside the mission of both the Military Advisory Assistance 
Group Vietnam (MAAG) and the United States Operation Mission (USOM) by the 
interagency task force on Vietnam.  Because of CIA experience in paramilitary 
operations supporting indigenous forces in Laos, the interagency task force on 
Vietnam recommended that the CIA should maintain complete control over 
paramilitary and irregular counterinsurgent operations in South Vietnam.  The CIA 
was granted a blank check to conduct operations in Vietnam by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in January, 1962.97 With Secretary of Defense authorization to 
bypass traditional decision making structures in Vietnam, the CIA could circumvent 
the cumbersome decision making process hindering the American response to the 
communist insurgency in South Vietnam and focus on the villages – the heart of the 
insurgency.  
The Montagnards cautiously welcomed American involvement in the Central 
Highlands. After US personnel proved themselves reliable partners, recruitment to 
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the CIDG program became easy because of the racial antipathy that existed between 
the Montagnards and Vietnamese.  CIA case officers and Army Special Forces 
soldiers brought money, material, and access to medical services to the 
Montagnards, increasing their standard of living and building a fast growing 
allegiance to the CIDG program among the Highland People. 
Vital to the success of the program was the CIA recruitment of a member of 
the International Voluntary Services, David Nuttle.  Nuttle was assigned by the IVS to 
the Central Highlands to develop, implement, and manage economic and agricultural 
programs to increase the standard of living among the indigenous tribes.  Fluent in 
the Rhade language and customs, Nuttle quickly gained the confidence of tribal 
leaders who vented their frustration with both the government and communist 
insurgents.  Nuttle was informed by tribal leaders that communist forces were 
gaining traction among the Montagnards by promising autonomy and equal 
protection of the law to protect their customs and tribal mores.  As arming the 
Montagnards through the CIDG program gained traction, Colby expressed the 
concerns of the Ngo brothers that the United States was suspected of supporting 
tribal autonomy, complicating United States–Vietnamese political relations.98  After 
many assurances by Colby that the CIDG program would only assist to defeat a 
counterinsurgency and promising Vietnamese presence through Vietnamese Special 
Forces soldiers, Diem agreed to allow the continuation of the CIDG program. 
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Dave Nuttle and Special Forces Medic Paul Campbell began to build support 
for the CIDG among the Montagnards in the fall of 1961.  Focusing on Darlac 
Province, Nuttle and Campbell began surveying tribes within a 70 kilometer radius of 
the provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot.  Nuttle would explore the political situation 
in the various villages surveyed, while Campbell conducted medical examinations 
and treatments of Montagnards.  Tribal leaders expressed hesitation in supporting 
the American backed program, worrying that the Americans would exploit 
indigenous forces.  Part of this hesitation was a direct result of the proximity of these 
villages to communist sanctuaries.  Government forces could not secure these 
villages, leaving them vulnerable to communist intimidation once the South 
Vietnamese military withdrew after daily patrols.  It was decided that Buon Enao, a 
Rhade village 6 miles from Ban Me Thout, would be the village selected for a trial of 
the CIDG program due to its relative security from communist forces. 
Nuttle and Campbell approached the village elders of Buon Enao in October 
of 1961.  Campbell noted that village elders “took all proposals as something sneaky 
and…went to great conferences on all we said until they were satisfied.”99 Part of 
the hesitation on the village elders’ part stems from the inability of anticommunist 
forces to protect these villages once they rendered support to government forces.  
Nuttle and Campbell requested that a perimeter fence and a hospital to care for the 
surrounding villages be built.  Village elders objected to each request, forcing Nuttle 
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and Campbell to resolve each concern in order to get village elders at Buon Enao to 
approve the implementation of the CIDG program.  Finally, in November 1961 
construction of a perimeter fence and dispensary began, along with the arming and 
training on 50 local villagers from Buon Enao and 125 more Montagnards from 
surrounding villages.  These villagers were employed into the program for 35 
piasters per day, the equivalent of 50 cents a day in 1961.100   After a week of 
operations in Buon Enao, the Rhade tribesmen “… were lining up at the front gate to 
get into the program.  This kicked off the recruiting program, and we didn’t have to 
do much recruiting.  The word went pretty fast from village to village.”101 The CIDG 
program spread quickly exhibiting the famous pacification doctrine of “tache 
d’huile” or oil spot theory created by Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalev Lyautey in 
Morocco during the early part of the 20th century.102    Montagnard tribesmen began 
to welcome the American presence in the Central Highlands once trust and mutual 
reliance was verified between Montagnard leaders and Americans.  Montagnard 
elders hoped American influence and presence in the highlands would act as a buffer 
against the Vietnamese political intrusion into the highlands, similar to the French 
role of keeping the Vietnamese out, and establishing a semiautonomous indigenous 
region.  But with the success of the CIDG program came the covetous eye of the U.S. 
Army who saw the CIDG program as an offensive tool against the infiltration of 
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communist men and material on the Ho Chi Min trail.   
The CIA administration of the CIDG program lasted for thirteen months.  In 
January of 1963 the CIA was ordered to turn all operational activity of the CIDG 
program to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in operation 
“Switchback.”  During the 13 months of CIA administration, the CIDG program 
“secured several hundred villages, some 300,000 civilians and several hundred 
square miles of territory from the Viet Cong, utilizing some 38,000 armed civilian 
irregulars.”103 CIDG creator William Colby lamented that the program under 
Pentagon control lost its primary purpose as a defensive operation that involved the 
people “…taking charge of their own affairs…”104 and that the United States decided 
to fight a conventional war instead of meeting the communists on their battlefield 
for the hearts and minds of the rural population.105  As the CIDG program grew 
under Pentagon control, Vietnamese politicians in Saigon grew worried about the 
possible political crisis that could erupt due to the arming of the Montagnards.  The 
program’s efficiency began to dwindle in the spring of 1963 as regular army officers 
changed the nature of the program from a defensive to offensive program.  Whole 
villages were relocated to different locations throughout the Highlands to begin 
conducting offensive operations against North Vietnamese infiltration along the 
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borders of Laos and Cambodia.  Increasing Vietnamese distrust of the Montagnards 
culminated in the government’s mass disarming of CIDG units.106 This disarming 
further alienated many paramilitary soldiers who had fought to secure the rural 
areas of the Central Highlands from further subjection to communist forces.  This 
betrayal by the government through the confiscation of Montagnard weapons 
reignited Montagnard nationalism contributing to the political instability plaguing 
South Vietnam. 
General Khanh continued to face a deteriorating political situation 
throughout 1964, constantly battling internal attacks and the ever present 
communist insurgency.  Understanding the importance of the Central Highlands to 
securing South Vietnam, he began to make gestures of goodwill towards the 
Montagnards in an effort to win their loyalty.  He released Y-Bham Enoul and other 
BAJARAKA leaders jailed since the 1958 protests.  Khanh attempted to understand 
Montagnard concerns by conducting a conference in May 1964 that would allow 
Montagnard leaders to present their grievances to the head of the South 
Vietnamese Government.  This was the first time a Vietnamese head of state had 
initiated and attended a meeting with the Montagnards, allowing them a venue to 
express their concerns.  Unfortunately, Khanh became quickly inundated by larger 
political concerns in the summer and fall of 1964.  Internal attacks from anti-Khanh 
forces were a constant threat, as were the Buddhist protests filling the streets of 
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Saigon.  It was under the guise of this political turmoil that the BAJARAKA movement 
combined with the Khmer and Cham nationalist movements to create the United 
Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races (FULRO).  
American and Vietnamese officials were awakened Sunday morning 
September 20, 1964 with the news that the American trained Montagnards had 
openly rebelled in five CDIG camps located in Darlac and Quang Duc provinces.  
During the initial stages of the rebellion the South Vietnamese flag was removed 
from the camp and replaced by the FULRO flag representing the aspirations for the 
creation of an autonomous state for Montagnards.107  Khanh quickly began to blame 
“foreigners [American] and communists”108 for instigating the rebellion and 
demanding that an immediate show of force be taken to end the rebellion.  
American officials were given time to attempt to mediate a peaceful solution to the 
rebellion, allowing Colonel John F. Freund to fly to Buon Sar Pa to negotiate an end 
to the rebellion.109  Freund would later be awarded the Bronze Star for his work in 
mediating an end to the rebellion without further bloodshed.110 
A list of FULRO demands to end the rebellion included a single representative 
to negotiate on behalf of all highlanders with the Saigon government; foreign 
economic and military aid to be funneled directly to a highland administration, 
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bypassing the corrupt South Vietnamese government; the right to maintain and 
receive American military training for a highland defense force; and the complete 
removal of Vietnamese from the Central Highlands allowing the return of tribal land 
to the Montagnards. Anthropologist Gerald Hickey, who was assigned to Vietnam as 
special advisor with the RAND Corporation, met with FULRO leaders at Buon Enao on 
Tuesday, September 22.  These local FULRO leaders stated that the cause of the 
Montagnard rebellion was to force the South Vietnamese government to act and 
address Montagnard concerns about policies detrimental to highland customs and 
ancestral heritage. 111 The Vietnamese reluctantly took a back seat to the resolution 
of the rebellion until September 27, when Khanh, angered by what he considered 
eight days of ineffective negotiations, ordered Vietnamese Special Forces in the 
Highlands to surround the besieged camps and force the rebellious Montagnards to 
lay down their arms.112 Colonel Freund was notified of the attack plans and 
coordinated a release of all hostages and the laying down of FULRO arms before the 
attack could occur.113  This move by Colonel Freund avoided further bloodshed and 
ended the September 1964 Montagnard Rebellion.  This rebellion was the first of 
many rebellions that would continue to plague various South Vietnamese 
administrations until the Fall of Saigon in April of 1975. 
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor was completely surprised by the FULRO backed 
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Montagnard uprising in September of 1964.114  Taylor and other American officials 
felt that the Montagnard nationalist movement FULRO was “…encouraged by 
success of Buddhist[s] and students to push their demands.”115 Taylor recognized 
that the Montagnards had legitimate complaints against the government for policies 
pursued that attempted to assimilate Montagnards into Vietnamese society.  He also 
recognized that the Montagnard nationalist problem had to be addressed by Khanh, 
which would further contribute “… to [an] atmosphere of weakness that increasingly 
surrounds him [Khanh].”116  As Khanh grew weaker, the need for American military 
intervention to stabilize the security situation to allow for the development of a 
viable civilian government grew more essential.   
Ever since Khanh’s January coup, the South Vietnamese political situation had 
continued to deteriorate.  The constant pressure placed on Khanh by internal 
political and social forces worried American personnel about the stability of the 
situation in South Vietnam.  The American purpose in Vietnam was to “Prevent 
Communist Domination of South Vietnam.”117 With the weakening political situation 
under Khanh, American personnel were constantly debating the merits of American 
military escalation of the Vietnam War.  With the inability of the Saigon government 
to secure the strategically vital Central Highlands, its ability to defeat the communist 
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insurgency was seriously hampered.  The threat of Montagnard revolts lead by 
FURLO “…pose[d] an immediate and very serious problem for the GVN [Government 
of Vietnam].”118 The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 led to American reprisal 
bombings of North Vietnamese targets on August 5, 1964.  The purpose of these 
bombings was to demonstrate American support for South Vietnam and to improve 
South Vietnamese morale and political stability.  The bombings had the opposite 
effect, further deteriorating the political situation with “an abortive coup, a 
Montagnard revolt, further factional fighting, a weakening of Khanh’s position, and 
general deterioration.”119  Montagnard nationalism was a persistent political threat 
to the government, due to its command of the strategically important Central 
Highlands.  After the September 1964 rebellion, Y-Bham Enoul and an estimated 
3,000–5,000120 American trained CIDG members fled to Cambodia to stage a 
constant military threat to the government.121  Subsequent Montagnard nationalist 
uprisings organized by FULRO distracted the Saigon Government from its main 
responsibility of battling the communist insurgency.  
In October of 1964 Khanh conducted another meeting with Montagnard 
leaders in an effort to quell Montagnard political dissidence.  Held in the highland 
city of Pleiku, Vietnamese officials wanted to discuss the political demands that 
                                                          
118 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1964–1968, 
Volume 1, Vietnam, 1964, 368. 
119 Ball, “Top Secret: The Prophecy the President Rejected,” 36–50.  
120  Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development, vii. 
121 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1964–1968, 
Volume 1, Vietnam, 1964, 448. 
70 
instigated the 1964 “Montagnard Problem.”122 The difficulty faced by the 
Vietnamese government was that Montagnards “… have never had a feeling of 
loyalty and attachment to the Vietnamese Government.  In fact, average 
Montagnards in both cities and hamlets would like to rid Highlands of Vietnamese 
settlers and government.”123 The strong desire for autonomy among the 
Montagnard people threatened the ability of the Saigon government to prosecute 
an effective war that relied on the control of the Central Highlands to extricate South 
Vietnam from communist infiltration.  This was only possible with the help of 
Montagnard paramilitary units who were intimate with the land and people of the 
Central Highlands. 
The Pleiku conference was held on October 15 and 16, 1964.  Various 
delegations arrived at the conference representing different tribes and 
administrative areas.  Each delegation was presented with the opportunity to 
express its concerns and aspirations.  After the completion of the presentations, the 
delegates on site determined to focus on the comprehensive list of grievances and 
aspirations presented by the delegation from Darlac province.  This list included the 
creation of government policy that protected Montagnard culture, the creation of 
government sponsored programs to increase access to education in their native 
languages, competent modern health care, an increase of government 
administration positions available to Montagnards, the promotion of Montagnard 
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military personnel to officer and NCO ranks, a Montagnard military force of 25,000 
to 50,000 personnel serving under the Montagnard flag, and the direct military and 
economic support of foreign governments without the intervention of the 
government in Saigon.  Most importantly, Montagnard leaders wanted the 
government to pass a law that allowed indigenous peoples to own land, which the 
current law did not allow.  Khanh promised to implement the majority of these 
demands, only refusing to authorize the bypassing of Saigon in relation to foreign 
military and economic support and the creation of a Montagnard military force that 
could be used to extract by force its desired concessions from politicians in 
Saigon.124 
After the completion of the Pleiku conference, American advisors in Vietnam 
strongly encouraged Khanh to implement the Montagnard political concessions he 
had agreed to in Pleiku.  Khanh never actively managed the Montagnard problem, 
choosing to authorize basic rights but never implementing the full social and political 
reforms that would help end Montagnard political dissidence.  This lack of proactive 
political management continued to anger American diplomats and military 
personnel who determined by February 1965 “…to convey to the military that we 
are not with Khanh all the way this time and that we sympathize with concerns of 
other generals.”125  Premier Khanh recognized that American support for his removal 
was a direct result of his vocal opposition to increasing American involvement and 
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his overtures to communist forces to end the conflict.126  Khanh neglected to 
recognize the role his political inadequacies played in his forced resignation and exile 
and American escalation.  Attempting to better the political situation in South 
Vietnam, the United States supported the anti-Khanh factions, forcing Khanh to 
resign and go into exile in February 1965.  The resignation of General Khanh initiated 
a revolving door presidency in South Vietnam that contributed to the political 
instability that influenced American escalation of the Vietnam War to combat the 
growing communist threat to South Vietnam.   
By 1965 the Saigon government had addressed some of the biggest issues 
causing political and ethnic tension between the Montagnards and the South 
Vietnamese.  Legislation was passed that legalized the Montagnard right to own 
land, overturning legislation enacted by President Diem to punish Montagnards for 
their support of the French.  At the same time legislation passed that reestablished 
the tribal legal system and permitted the teaching of tribal language and history in 
primary schools.127  But the growing political turmoil caused by the increasing 
communist threat delayed the implementation of these laws, providing the political 
motivation for the Montagnard nationalist movement FULRO to continue to press 
their political demands. 
The FULRO movement was widely supported by Montagnard leaders 
advocating for the fair and ethical treatment of the indigenous population.  Not all 
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Montagnard leaders officially joined the FULRO movement; many Montagnard 
leaders chose to stay politically involved with the Saigon government to advocate for 
political recognition through the established political process in Saigon.  The FULRO 
and non-FULRO political camps maintained close contact, coordinating efforts to 
peacefully and forcefully demand equitable treatment from Saigon.  By mid-1965 a 
non-FULRO leader defined the political relationship between the two camps by 
stating, “The aspirations of FULRO are the aspirations of all highland people.”128  
Montagnard leaders, both FULRO and non-FULRO, wanted multiple avenues of 
progression towards their stated goals of political recognition and Montagnard 
autonomy from Saigon.  During August–September, 1965, the government of 
General Nguyen Cao Ky opened negotiations with FULRO leaders at Ban Me Thout.  
During these negotiations dissident representatives maintained constant 
communication with non-FULRO Montagnard leaders helping to maintain unified 
efforts to achieve Montagnard political objectives.  These talks broke down in late 
November over the inability of the FULRO and Saigon representatives to agree upon 
a solution to the question of Montagnard autonomy.  In retaliation for the 
breakdown in talks and the continued political abuse imposed on the Montagnards, 
FULRO leaders organized a second armed revolt in December 1965. 
The December 1965 FULRO revolt was a short but violent demonstration of 
Montagnard will to take violent action to achieve their political aims.  On the 
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morning of Saturday, December 18, 1965, ninety-two Montagnard tribesmen, 
politically aligned with FULRO, captured Quang Duc’s provincial capital of Gia Nghia.  
Tribesmen convinced the South Vietnamese soldiers garrisoned in Gia Nghia to lay 
down their arms.  For the next five hours FULRO units maintained sentry, raising the 
FULRO flag over Gia Nghia to demonstrate their political desire for autonomy.  With 
the arrival of South Vietnamese army reinforcement Gia Nghia was retaken without 
a shot being fired, ending the second FULRO rebellion in Gia Nghia.129  However, a 
coordinated attack by FULRO units in Phu Bon Province killed thirty-five Vietnamese 
soldiers and civilians, turning the second FURLO rebellion violent.  In retribution for 
this attack the Saigon government tried and convicted four FULRO leaders involved 
in the killings sentencing them to death by firing squad.   Another fifteen FULRO 
soldiers were sentenced to five years of hard labor, followed by five years to life in 
prison.130 American State Department officials reported to Washington that Saigon’s 
handling of the failed December 1965 Montagnard uprising had “…stirred new tribal 
resentment and anticipation of harsh government treatment.”131  The “Montagnard 
problem” continued to exacerbate the political instability in the Central Highlands 
with the increasing influence of FULRO among the Montagnard population.  
Montagnard leaders grew more sympathetic to the FULRO movement as Saigon 
continued to stumble its way through understanding and resolving the political 
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demands of FULRO and Montagnard nationalism.132    
By 1966 the Saigon government began to take the “Montagnard problem”133 
seriously, creating for the first time a Special Commission for Highland Affairs 
(SCHA).  The well respected Bahnar tribal leader Paul Nur, who had been jailed with 
Y-Bham Enoul in 1958 for his activity with the BAJARAKA movement, was named 
commissioner.  Paul Nur’s political appointment made him the highest ranking 
Montagnard within the Saigon government.  Along with the creation of the SCHA, 
the Saigon government implemented the legislation passed in late 1964 that 
reestablished the highland legal system and the teaching of Montagnard languages 
and history in primary schools.  With the implementation of Montagnard friendly 
legislation, the SCHA worked as intermediaries between FULRO leader, Y Bham 
Enoul and the Saigon government.  Political talks were resumed in May 1966 with 
Montagnard representatives demanding the creation of a Statut Particulier, or a 
Montagnard bill of rights that would enumerate within a single document a 
guarantee of Montagnard political rights.134  The 1966 negotiations failed as a result 
of the Saigon government’s unwillingness to guarantee the Montagnard desire for 
political autonomy.  American political adviser to the government in Saigon 
continued to support the Montagnard cause, encouraging South Vietnamese leaders 
to make the necessary concessions to win the loyalty of indigenous peoples.  South 
Vietnamese leaders worried about giving too much to the Montagnards during 
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negotiations.  One Vietnamese general commented that the Montagnards “…are like 
children with candy.  If you give them too much it will make them sick.”135 South 
Vietnamese leaders grew angry over the United States’ advocacy for the rights of the 
Montagnards.  Most South Vietnamese leaders disliked the CIDG program, blaming 
the United States for the political upheaval among the Montagnards in Central 
Highlands.  
In 1966, South Vietnamese Generals, led by Major General Vinh Loc, asked 
the United States to shut down the CIDG program.  General Loc wanted to disarm 
the Montagnards and dissolve the American supported military units to eliminate 
FULRO’s military threat to the Saigon Government.136  The Montagnards were 
fiercely loyal to the American military personnel that trained and served with them 
in the battle against communism.  One of the big problems facing the United States 
was how to align Montagnard loyalty with the objectives of Saigon to establish an 
independent South Vietnamese state.  The United States strongly encouraged Saigon 
to implement the necessary social programs to win the loyalty of the 
Montagnards.137  General Ky continued to placate American officials seeking a 
resolution to the “Montagnard problem.”138  In February 1966, General Ky made a 
speech in the highland city of Kontum declaring the Saigon government’s 
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“…determination to extend equal treatment to all Vietnamese citizens regardless of 
religion, region or ethnic origin….”139 Ky emphasized to American leaders that he 
would give greater consideration to the Montagnards to resolve the longstanding 
issues between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese.140  But Vietnamese racial 
antipathy towards the Montagnards complicated negotiations between the 
Montagnards and Saigon.141     
The United States continued to struggle finding a solution to the 
“Montagnard problem.”142  A Special Forces soldier commenting on the issue of 
Montagnard loyalty said, “We have to find some way to transfer this loyalty unless 
we plan to make them [Montagnards] the 51st state.”143  American officials were 
instructed to “… not concern themselves with the specific aspirations of ethnic or 
political groups which are considered to be contrary to the interests of the 
Vietnamese nation as a whole.”144  American military and political representatives 
were never to deal directly with any member of FULRO, but to refer all inquiries of 
assistance to their Vietnamese counterpart.  When issues arose between the 
Montagnards and Vietnamese, American officials were supposed to allow them to 
work it out, avoiding the demonstration of favoritism for either ethnic group.  Along 
with avoiding intervention to resolve Vietnamese / Montagnard disputes, American 
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personnel were encouraged to advocate for open dialog between FULRO / 
Montagnard leaders and their Vietnamese counterparts on the political issues 
surrounding Montagnard nationalism. Vietnamese leaders continued to grow angry 
at American personnel over the perceived preference towards Montagnards; 
accusing American officials of fomenting Montagnard demands for autonomy.145 
These accusations of American personnel resulted in the reassigning and dismissal of 
American personnel to calm South Vietnamese anger over accusations of American 
encouragement of Montagnard nationalism.146 Throughout the rest of the year 1966 
and 1967 the “other political problem”147 continued to complicate the American and 
South Vietnamese efforts to focus their attention on communist aggression, the 
primary threat to the sovereignty of South Vietnam.   
 By August of 1967 the 1966 Montagnard Statut Particulier began to gain 
traction with the support of General Vinh Loc.  The Statut Particulier was designed to 
meet some of the basic aspirations and concerns surrounding Montagnard political 
identity in South Vietnam.  On August 29, 1967, General Thieu signed the Statut 
Particulier granting increased political autonomy and enumerating specific rights 
guaranteed to the Montagnards.148  Montagnard suspicion of Vietnamese intentions 
and historic racial differences continued to keep Y-Bham Enoul and FULRO hesitant 
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to realign politically with Saigon until significant concessions promised were 
implemented and Saigon’s efforts at political reconciliation confirmed.     
By 1968 the United States was deeply embroiled in the Vietnam War.  
Political sentiment in the United States was against the War and encouraged a 
speedy political resolution and withdrawal of all US personnel from South Vietnam.  
American military policies continued to disrupt the lives of the Montagnards caught 
between the battles raging in the Central Highlands for control of South Vietnam.  
The Montagnards were relocated onto reservations that allowed for the American 
creation of free fire zones.  People found within the free fire zones were 
automatically classified as enemy combatants allowing military personnel to fire on 
any person found within those zones. This policy led to the deaths of many innocent 
civilians who were attempting to escape the turmoil of war by returning to their 
ancestral lands.  As the Vietnam War progressed, the political and military situation 
continued to weaken, placing undue burden on the indigenous populations of the 
Central Highlands. 
In an effort to better lead the Montagnard people and establish a legitimate 
form of political representation, FULRO leader Y-Bham Enoul left his Cambodian 
base camp in August of 1968 to enter negotiations with representatives of the South 
Vietnamese Government.  This was not the first attempt by FULRO to negotiate with 
the Saigon government.  Negotiation attempts were made during each year since 
80 
the 1964 Montaganard Rebellions that thrust the “other political problem”149 onto 
Vietnamese and American officials.  These early negotiations broke down due to the 
inability of FULRO and Vietnamese representatives to resolve longstanding cultural 
and political issues. The political reconciliation of FULRO with the government in 
1968 had an immediate impact in terms of calming the political discontent of the 
Central Highlands between the Montagnards and the government. With the 
reintroduction of a Montagnard force of 3,000–5,000150 trained jungle fighters the 
immediate military impact could be felt in the strategically important highlands, 
increasing military and intelligence gathering capabilities.   
Both parties approached these negotiations in Ban Me Thuot in August of 
1968 with a renewed resolve to overcome the political and cultural challenges that 
had plagued Vietnamese and Montagnard relations for centuries.  This new resolve 
was accentuated by the attendance of Y-Bham Enoul, the Rhade leader of FULRO 
who had shunned the previous negotiations and instead sent an envoy to represent 
the FULRO organization.  Discussed at the conference was a list of aspirations similar 
to the list presented at Pleiku in October of 1964.  Chief among Montagnard 
concerns was the creation of an all Montagnard military unit led by Montagnards; 
the right to fly the Montagnard flag at all times alongside the Vietnamese flag; the 
creation of a Montagnard governmental office to handle all Montagnard affairs; the 
participation of Montagnard representatives in all conferences with foreign officials; 
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and the direct supply of aid to the highlands, bypassing Vietnamese officials in 
Saigon.151  
After months of negotiations, political reconciliation was finalized on 
December 12, 1968, because “all of our [Montagnard] demands have been met in 
discussions,”152 but not all members of FULRO were “convinced the South 
Vietnamese government would grant the Montagnards full citizenship in return for 
pledges of allegiance.”153 Reports emerged that an estimated 250 dissidents 
captured Y-Bham Enoul and forced him and his family to live in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, attempting to persuade him to continue the FULRO movement.  This new 
Montagnard political identity fought and negotiated for by Montagnard nationalist 
representatives would last until the fall of Saigon in April 1975.  With the 
reunification of Vietnam under the communist government in Hanoi, Montagnards 
would enter a difficult struggle to establish a new political identity, facing 
government policies of abuse and assimilation into the nationalist Vietnamese 
society.  These policies pursued by the communist government in Hanoi are 
reminiscent of Ngo Dinh Diem’s failed policies of cultural assimilation, which, 
combined with Montagnard interaction with Catholic missionaries, French colonialist 
policies, and American training and arming through the CIDG program, ended the 
Montagnard village centered identity and created a nationalist movement focused 
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on the creation of a modern political identity.  Montagnard nationalism was not the 
primary reason for American escalation of the Vietnam War, but a contributing 
factor to the disintegration of the South Vietnamese domestic political situation that 
led to the American decision to reintroduce American combat forces onto the Asian 
mainland. The inability of the Saigon government to integrate Montagnards into a 
cohesive South Vietnamese nation state made it difficult to establish the most 
important tenant of any counterinsurgent strategy – a viable central government 
that can “maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and 
economically stable and viable.”154 This inability of President Diem and subsequent 
South Vietnamese governments to establish a viable South Vietnamese “imagined 
community,” inclusive of all ethnic groups, as demonstrated by the “other political 
problem [of Montagnard nationalism] ,”155 complicated the Saigon and United States 
governments’ efforts to combat communism, ultimately leading to the failed effort 
of creating an independent, communist free South Vietnam.  
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